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Abstract1: International financial markets are far from perfect. Because of problems related to contract
enforcement borrowers often end up being rationed; the lenders tend to constrain the amount lent ex ante in
order to motivate the borrowers to fulfil their obligations and not default ex post. In this paper we take as
our point of departure a relationship like this between a lender (or consortium of lenders) and the government
of a poor country and ask: How is this relationship affected by the fact that the borrowing country also
receives foreign aid? The answer depends on how the aid is given. If the aid inflow is exogenous we show
that some types of aid are effective in the sense that the aid has a positive effect on the credit obtained and
aggregate welfare. Other types are directly counterproductive. If the aid inflow is endogenous, supplied by
altruistic donors as part of a safety-net, serious incentive distortions arise, crowding out private credit. Such
aid may actually be welfare-reducing in the recipient country. The paper also contains a discussion of how
aid will influence lenders’ incentives to give relief if the initial debt is not sustainable.
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1 Introduction
International financial markets are far from perfect. Problems related to contract enforcement are severe,
especially in situations where sovereigns (governments) borrow in private (commercial) financial markets.
There exists no international authority capable of enforcing such contracts2. Why should the borrowers
repay their debt under such circumstances? For them to be willing to repay they must be confronted with
some costs in case of default. In the traditional literature at least three types of costs are discussed: bad
reputation and lack of access to international capital markets in the future, assets in foreign countries may
be seized, and sanctions reducing the benefits from international trade may be imposed. However, any kind
default-related costs - also pure domestic costs caused by for example a default-related economic down-turn
or collateral being lost in case of default - will have similar disciplining effects. The threats of sanctions, the
collateral offered, as well as other default-related costs must be known by both the lenders and the borrowers
when the loan contract is signed3.
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) were the first to show that in a situation where contract enforcement is
difficult, the borrowers’ ability to repay is of limited importance; it is their willingness that really matters.
1The author wants to thank Rune Jansen Hagen for comments on an earlier draft.
2See Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2002) for a survey of ideas related to bancrupcy procedures for sovereigns - never implemented.
See also Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) for arguments that the possibilities for creditor legal actions against sovereigns
have increased recently.
3Credibility may, of course, be a problem here. Ex-post, in case of default, the lenders may end up being better off without
imposing the sanctions (actual repayment will be higher if they don’t than if they do) and the borrowers will certainly wish to
withdraw the collateral offered ex-ante. However, we disregard such credibility problems here.
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As a rule the willingness to repay ex-post tends to be lower the higher is the debt obtained ex-ante, i.e., most
cost specifications lose their power when the debt becomes very high. As a result, the borrower typically
wants to borrow as much as possible and then default. The lender, therefore, will tend to constrain the
amount lent ex-ante in order to motivate the lender not to default; some type of credit rationing is likely
to result. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), chapter 6, contains sketches of some of the most interesting models
designed along such lines, one of which is the inspiration for the basic model used in this paper.
Many of the governments borrowing from commercial lenders also borrow from multilateral institutions
like the IMF or the WB. Whether multilateral lending leads to more or less privat credit is a question
that has been studied by several researchers, for example Cottarelli and Gioanni (2002). That literature
is summarized by Hagen (2006) in the following way: ”Empirical studies indicate a neutral effect overall,
with private agents’ negative reactions being approximately cancelled by increased funds from other official
sources”.
Many of the borrowing governments also receive (bilateral) foreign aid. How such aid (and donors’ activ-
ities) might affect privat lending, has not been much discussed in the existing literature. This paper offers an
analytical approach to that question. We first consider the aid amount obtained by the borrowing govern-
ment as exogenous and discuss how aid of different kinds affect the relationship between the government and
a commercial lender (or consortium of lenders). Some types of aid works well, in the sense that the lender’s
incentives to lend improves, investment and welfare increase, etc. Other types of aid have the opposite types
of effects and are unlikely to benefit the recipient.
Then some of the aid inflow is endogenized, assumed to be supplied by altruistic donors as part of a
safety-net. Pedersen (1996) and (2001), among others, has shown in other contexts that altruistic donors
may distort incentives in a negative way. Will this be the case in the present context as well? The answer
is, unfortunately, yes. We show, among other things, that it may actually be in the borrowing government’s
own interest to refuse to become a client of altruistic donors and part of their international safety-net.
In addition to the traditional approach, focusing on access to new credit we also show how a simple
respecification of the basic model, influenced by Omland (2005), may allow us to throw light on questions
related to aid and voluntary debt relief.
1.1 The model structure
The time horizon is two periods, called period 1 and period 2. The sovereign (government) makes productive
investments in period 1. The investment strategy chosen depends on whether, in period 2, he plans to repay
the debt falling due inclusive of interest (Non-default - N) or not (Default - D). The sovereign knows that if
he chooses to default, there will be some costs. However, the lender is bound to lose if the sovereign borrower
decides to default and, as a consequence, it is in his interest to keep him from defaulting. That is why the
access to credit may be constrained or debt relief given if initial debt is too high.
Considering the aid inflow to be exogenous we first analyse399 the situation where the borrowing sovereign
has discretion over investment, in the sense that he is free to decide how much to invest in the domestic
economy after an agreement on access to new credit (section 2) or debt relief (section 3) is in place. In
section 4 we consider the situation where he is able to commit to an investment strategy before entering into
negotiatios on access to new credit or debt relief. In a world where mechanisms for credible commitments
of the type in question typically are in short supply, the discretion case may seem the most realistic. Then,
in section 5, the aid inflow is endogenized. The basic model used is influenced by a similar model found in
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), chapter 64.
4See Dooley & al (2007) for rather critical comments on this type of literature - arguing that countries consciously accumulate
foreign reserves and implicitely offer them as collateral to foreign lenders and investors. In our view, however, their comments
are not relevant for most poor and middle-income countries.
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We let C symbolize aggregate consumption, Y be some exogenous income (domestic value added), A be
foreign aid, K be (productive) investment in period 1, and D represent the face value of the debt falling
due in period 2. D also represents the amount borrowed in period 1 in a situation where the initial debt is
zero. To make things simple we assume that the sovereign has access to some constant-returns technology
and express the income generated in period 2 if investment is carried out in period 1 as (1 + α)K. The
interest rate is r and we assume that α  r, i.e., the marginal (and average) product of capital is higher
than the interest paid on foreign debt. To make things simple we assume that the interest rate is exogenous,
for example because there is competition among potential lenders who all have the same opportunity cost
of capital.
Default will here be interpreted to mean that the sovereign in period 2 refuses to repay the amount falling
due as well as interest. Default, however, imlies costs of some type, related to sanctions, domestic economic
down-turn, or collateral. We model the costs in a very simple way: ηK (1 + α)K + ηAA
D
2 + ηY Y 2.
Here 0 ηK  1 works as a ”tax” on the return from investment, for example caused by reduced access
to the world market resulting in reduced output prices and/or increased input prices, worsened domestic
market situation, or delberate offering of a share of output as collateral. 0 ≤ ηY  1 is an exogenous
cost expressed as a share of other types of domestic value added, for example worsened terms of trade
for ”traditional” export products as a result of trade sanctions, worsened domestic market situation, or
collateral. 0 ≤ ηA ≤ 1 is the share of the aid donated in case of default which ends up in the lender’s pockets
- because it has been offered as collateral or because the donor imposes conditions - and/or being withheld
5. In addition, the access to foreign aid may differ, AN2 in case of non-default and A
D
2 if the result is default.
For non-default to be better than default, as perceived by the borrowing sovereign, the following must hold:
A
N
2 −D (1 + r) ≥ A
D
2 −
(
ηK (1 + α)K + ηY Y 2 + ηAA
D
2
)
or
D ≤ 1
1 + r
[
ηK (1 + α)K + ηY Y 2 + ηAA
D
2 +
(
A
N
2 −A
D
2
)]
(1)
and in the exercises below the lender will typically make sure that this condition holds by not allowing D
to become too high.
It follows that we do not necessarily assume that any of the debitor’s default costs end up in the hands
of the creditor. The ”− ” means that the variable in question is exogenous.
We have already assumed that it is profitable for the government to borrow and invest one unit in period
1, given that the unit borrowed and interest is repaid in period 2, i.e., (1 + α) − (1 + r) = α − r  0. The
arguments below rely, in addition, on the assumption that it is even more profitable not to repay the debt,
i.e., (1 + α) (1− ηK) α− r. This is actually a restriction on the severeness of the sancions to be imposed
in case of default. Another way of expressing it is ηK (1 + α) (1 + r)6.
2 New loans and discretion over investment
We first discuss the sovereigns investment startegy in case he does not plan to default and then in case he
does. Then, given that the creditor does not want the sovereign to default, the optimal amount lent, as
perceived by the lender, is determined. Finally, som comparative static analyses are carried out.
2.1 Non-default (N)
Assuming that initial debt in period 1 is zero7 the two periods’ budget equations may be expressed as:
5See Rose (2005) for evidence that in practice, default seems to be strongly associated with reduced trade, and Levy-Yeyati
and Panizza (2006) for evidence that the costs may be of domestic origin.
6Obstfeld and Rogoff (1986) p. 383 argue that this is a very reasonable assumption.
7If here was an initial debt, D, access to new credit, D − D, would enter period 1’s budget constraint instead of D. An
increase of D works as a reduction of A1.
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C1 = Y 1 +A1 +D −K and (2a)
C2 = Y 2 +A
N
2 + (1 + α)K − (1 + r)D (2b)
or using period 1’s budget equation to express K as a function of C1, the intertemporal budget equation
may be written as
C2 = Y 2 +A
N
2 + (1 + α)
(
Y 1 +A1 − C1
)
+ (α− r)D (2c)
It shows that there is a clear and simple trade-off between consumption in the two periods. For a given level
of foreign borrowing, D, the real return to investment/capital determines what will be called the accounting
rate of interest, ARI: dC2dC1 = −
(
1 +ARIN
)
= − (1 + α) .
The sovereign is assumed to maximize the welfare function U = lnC1 + β lnC2 where 0  β ≤ 1 is the
discount factor. The first-order condition may be expressed as
dU
dC1
=
1
C1
− β 1
C2
(1 +ARI) = 0 (3)
from which the two periods’ consumption and the aggregate productive investment may be found. Letting
Y N = Y 1 +A1 +
1
1 + α
[
D (α− r) + Y 2 +AN2
]
(4)
be the present value (in period 1) of what will be called the country’s disposable income (slightly abusing
terms) we have
CN1 =
1
1 + β
[
Y N
]
, CN2 =
β (1 + α)
1 + β
[
Y N
]
, and (5a)
KN =
β
1 + β
[
Y 1 +A1 +D
]− 1
1 + β

(
Y 2 +A
N
2
)
−D (1 + r)
1 + α
 (5b)
The welfare level as perceived by the sovereign may now be calculated:
UN = (1 + β) ln
(
1
1 + β
[
Y N
])
+ β ln (β (1 + α)) (5c)
2.2 Default (D)
In case of default, sanctions of the types discussed above, see (1), are imposed in period 2. Assuming that
default means cancelling all debt obligations8 the two periods’ budget equations may now be expressed as:
C1 = Y 1 +A1 +D −K and (6a)
C2 = (1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2 + (1− ηK) (1 + α)K (6b)
or using period 1’s budget equation to express K as a function of C1, the intertemporal budget equation
may now be written as
C2 = (1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2 + (1− ηK) (1 + α)
(
Y 1 +A1 +D − C1
)
(6c)
8Maybe repudiation would be a better word than default here. If default meant only a partial cancellation of debt obligations
the rest could easily be taken into account as an exogenous cost i period 2. It will work in a similar way as a reduction of A
D
2 .
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For a given level of foreign borrowing, D, again the ARI is given by the real return to investment/capital
- this time after correcting for the sanction cost: dC2dC1 = −
(
1 +ARID
)
= − (1− ηK) (1 + α). The sanction
costs makes sure that ARID  ARIN , i.e. the terms on which period 1 consumption can be transformed
into period 2 consumption are better in the non-default case than in the default case.
The sovereign also in this case maximizes the welfare function, see (3) but the ARI differs. Letting
Y D = Y 1 +A1 +D +
1
(1− ηK) (1 + α)
[
(1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2
]
(7)
be the present value of the country’s disposable income, we now have
CD1 =
1
1 + β
[
Y D
]
, CD2 =
β (1− ηK) (1 + α)
1 + β
[
Y D
]
, (8a)
KD =
β
1 + β
[
Y 1 +A1 +D
]− 1
1 + β
[
(1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2
(1− ηK) (1 + α)
]
, and (8b)
UD = (1 + β) ln
(
1
1 + β
[
Y D
])
+ β ln (β (1− ηK) (1 + α)) (8c)
2.3 The debt limit
Given the way our model has been set up it is clear that the lender wants to avoid default. This means that
he must make sure that it is in the borrower’s own interest to fullfill his obligations, i.e., that UD −UN ≤ 0.
Otherwise the borrower will choose to default. This condition allows the lender to find the upper limit
of lending. Actually, given the example with which we are working, this upper limit may be calculated
explicitely, see appendix 1:
D∗ = Ω
[(
1
1− ηK
) β
1+β
(
Y 1 +A1 +
Y 2 +A
N
2
1 + α
)
(9)
−
(
Y 1 +A1 +
(1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2
(1− ηK) (1 + α)
)]
where Ω = 1
1−
(
1
1−ηK
) β
1+β (α−r1+α )
. The assumption that (1 + α) (1− ηK) α−r makes sure that Ω is strictly
positive and higher than unity.
There is no uncertainty in this model and because of the lender’s rationing of the borrower, setting
D = D∗, there will actually never be any default. And the level of productive investment can be found from
the KN -function above (5b), given an access to credit equal to D∗ :
K∗ =
β
1 + β
[
Y 1 +A1 +D∗
]− 1
1 + β

(
Y 2 +A
N
2
)
−D∗ (1 + r)
1 + α

Given D = D∗, K = K∗, and non-default the actual welfare level, as perceived by the borrowing and aid-
receiving sovereign, will be determined by what we have called the present value of his aggregate income,
Y N (4) and UN (5c), i.e.:
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Y ∗ = Y 1 +A1 +
1
1 + α
[
D∗ (α− r) + Y 2 +AN2
]
and
U∗ = (1 + β) ln
(
1
1 + β
[Y ∗]
)
+ β ln (β (1 + α))
2.4 Comparative statics
Even within such a simple framework it is possible to ask interesting questions, for example related to the
effectiveness of foreign aid, given that aid will affect the borrower’s incentives whether to default or not
and, accordingly, the lender’s willingness to lend. In the experiments made below all the changes are known
ex-ante and there are no surprises once D∗ has been determined.
Assume an increase of the expected inflow of aid in case of non-default in perod 2, A
N
2 by one unit. Now
non-default becomes more attractive for the sovereign and, as a result, the lender will increase D∗. He may
actually increase his lending by more than one unit. This kind of foreign aid has a clear crowding-in effect
on private credit:
dD∗
dA
N
2
= Ω
(
1
1− ηK
) β
1+β
(
1
1 + α
)
 0
The aid increase in isolation will cause investment to decrease but more loans works in the opposite direction.
Since what we have called the present value of disposable incom, Y ∗, goes up the welfare level will certainly
increase. We have
dY ∗
dA
N
2
=
1
1 + α
[
(α− r) dD
∗
dA
N
2
+ 1
]
= Ω
1
1 + α
 0
and the end value of disposable income certainly increases by more than one unit: (1 + α) dY
∗
dA
N
2
= Ω 1.
If the expected inflow of aid in case of default, A
D
2 , goes up the sovereign will conclude that default
becomes more attractive. As long as the lender is informed about this the amount lent will decrease and,
as a result, the equilibrium investment and welfare level must go down. The magnitude of the crowding out
effect depends on the share of the aid being lost for the recipient government in case of default. The lower
this share the more attractive the default regime becomes and the more crowding out of private credit will
be the result.
dD∗
dA
D
2
= Ω
(
− (1− ηA)
(1− ηK) (1 + α)
)
 0
Actually, one unit of such aid may easily end up causing the access to private credit to go down by much
more than one unit.
More aid in period 1, A1, will actually favour non-default and, accordingly, higher loans:
dD∗
dA1
= Ω
[(
1
1− ηK
) β
1+β
− 1
]
 0
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The reason is that in both regimes the sovereign will want to increase investment in order to enjoy some of
the benefits of the extra aid in period 2. However, in the default regime the return (after correcting for the
default costs) will be lower than in the non-default regime; one unit of increased consumption in period 2
costs more in the default case. That is why the non-default regime becomes more attractive and the credit
worthiness is increased. It is clear that both investment and the welfare level will increase.
What if the amount of foreign aid donated in period 2 is independent of whether the recipient defaults
or not, i.e., what if A
N
2 = A
D
2 = A2? How will a small increase work in this case?
dD∗
dA2
= Ω
1
1 + α
[(
1
1− ηK
) β
1+β
− 1− ηA
1− ηK
]
If no aid is lost for the recipient in case he defaults, i.e., if ηA = 0,
dD∗
dA2
will certainly be negative. A
sufficiently high ηA will, however, make
dD∗
dA2
positive. What about the welfare level? We have
dY ∗
dA2
=
1
1 + α
[
(α− r) dD
∗
dA2
+ 1
]
=
1
1 + α
[
Ω
(
α− r
1 + α
)((
1
1− ηK
) β
1+β
− 1− ηA
1− ηK
)
+ 1
]
 0
Again, by inspection, it is clear that if ηA is high enough
dY ∗
dA2
will be positive and welfare must increase. It
can actually be shown that even when ηA tends to zero, so that the reduction of D
∗ is at its maximum, will
Y ∗ increase.
When ηA = 0 this experiment represents an unconditional increase of disposable income in period 2. Of
course, since some of the benefits will be enjoyed in period 1 there must be a reduction of the investment
level in both regimes. One unit of consumption in period 1 costs less in terms of foregone consumption
in period 2 in the default regime than in the non-default regime. That is what makes the default regime
become more attractive and explains why credit worthiness, and accordingly, access to credit is reduced.
Default costs are very important in the present set-up. We have three types of such costs. By inspection
we can see that higher costs, no matter of what type, means reduced attractiveness of the default regime
and increased credit worthiness. As a result, the amount lent will increase and so will investment and
welfare. Exogenous changes of ηA and ηY work exactly like changes of A
D
2 with opposite sign. This means
that earmarking aid in ways that favours commercial creditors or providing collateral of some kind in case
of default will clearly be advantageous for the sovereign ex ante. A cost increase affecting the return to
investment, ηK , negatively will in addition increase the price of future consumption and discriminate against
investment in the default regime.
3 New face value (debt forgiveness) and discretion over invest-
ment
Assume now that the the country has inherited some debt from earlier periods, falling due in period 2 with
an amount so high that it motivates the sovereign to default and not repay anything. In order to motivate
the government to choose not to default, the creditor may, in period 1, forgive some of the debt, i.e., cut
down on the amount falling due in period 2. How will aid of the types discussed in section 2 affect the
creditor’s incentives to forgive debt? A small respecification of the model used above (see Omland (2005))
allows us to throw some light on that question. The respecification is simple: No new credit is given in
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period 1 and the creditor’s decision is simply to choose a new face value, D, of outstanding debt in perod 1,
falling due in period 2 with the amount D (1 + r).
3.1 Non-default (N)
The two periods’ budget equations in case of non-default may now be expressed as:
C1 = Y 1 +A1 −K and (10a)
C2 = Y 2 +A
N
2 + (1 + α)K − (1 + r)D (10b)
and the intertemporal budget equation is
C2 = Y 2 +A
N
2 + (1 + α)
(
Y 1 +A1 − C1
)− (1 + r)D (10c)
Now D only enters as an obligation to pay in period 2. There is no new credit in period 1.
The sovereign is still assumed to maximize the same welfare function. From the first-order condition (3),
remembering that the accounting rate of interest is ARIN , the two periods’ consumption and the aggregate
productive investment may be found. Letting
Y N = Y 1 +A1 +
1
1 + α
[
Y 2 +A
N
2 − (1 + r)D
]
(11)
be the present value of the country’s disposable income, we have
CN1 =
1
1 + β
[
Y N
]
, CN2 =
β (1 + α)
1 + β
[
Y N
]
, (12a)
KN =
β
1 + β
[
Y 1 +A1
]− 1
1 + β

(
Y 2 +A
N
2
)
−D (1 + r)
1 + α
 , and (12b)
UN = (1 + β) ln
(
1
1 + β
[
Y N
])
+ β ln (β (1 + α)) (12c)
3.2 Default (D)
In case of default the debt’s face value is irrelevant and the two periods’ budget equations may be expressed
as:
C1 = Y 1 +A1 −K and (13b)
C2 = (1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2 + (1− ηK) (1 + α)K or 13b
C2 = (1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2 + (1− ηK) (1 + α)
(
Y 1 +A1 − C1
)
(13c)
Remembering that the accounting rate of investment is ARID and letting
Y D = Y 1 +A1 +
1
(1− ηK) (1 + α)
[
(1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2
]
(14)
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be the present value of the country’s disposable income we have
CD1 =
1
1 + β
[
Y D
]
, CD2 =
β (1− ηK) (1 + α)
1 + β
[
Y D
]
, (15a)
KD =
β
1 + β
[
Y 1 +A1
]− 1
1 + β
[
(1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2
(1− ηK) (1 + α)
]
, and (15b)
UD = (1 + β) ln
(
1
1 + β
[
Y D
])
+ β ln (β (1− ηK) (1 + α)) (15c)
3.3 The debt limit
The creditor still wants to avoid default and will choose the highest possible face value where UD−UN ≤ 0.
Following the same procedures as in section 2 and appendix 1, the cut-off level of the face value, D∗, (the
upper limit), as perceived by the creditor can be found:
D∗ =
1(
1
1−ηK
) β
1+β
(
1+r
1+α
)
[(
1
1− ηK
) β
1+β (
Y 1 +A1
)]
+
1
1 + r
[
Y2 +A
N
2
]
− 1
(1 + r)
(
1
1−ηK
) β
1+β
(
(1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2
(1− ηK)
)
(16)
Again, since there is no uncertainty in this model and setting D = D∗, there will actually never be any
default. And the level of productive investment can be found from the KN -function (12b), given the face
value of outstanding debt D∗ :
K∗ =
β
1 + β
[
Y 1 +A1
]− 1
1 + β

(
Y 2 +A
N
2
)
−D∗ (1 + r)
1 + α

Given D = D∗, K = K∗, and non-default the actual welfare level (12c), as perceived by the borrowing and
aid-receiving sovereign, will be determined by the present value of his aggregate income (11):
Y ∗ = Y 1 +A1 +
1
1 + α
[
Y 2 +A
N
2 − (1 + r)D∗
]
and
U∗ = (1 + β) ln
(
1
1 + β
[Y ∗]
)
+ β ln (β (1 + α))
3.4 Comparative statics
In section 2, where the sovereign obtains credit in period 1, increased credit worthiness means access to more
credit and higher welfare for the country and increased profits for the lender. When debt forgiveness is on
the agenda, however, improved credit worthiness means less forgiveness, tougher debt obligations and often
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reduced welfare for the sovereign but, of course, higher profits for the creditor. Some of the following results
can be found in Omland (2005) in Norwegian.
Assume first an increase of the expected inflow of aid in case of non-default, A
N
2 by one unit. Now
non-default becomes more attractive for the sovereign and, as a result, the creditor will increase D∗, i.e., the
face value after forgiveness. There is actually 100% crowding out in this case:
dD∗
dA
N
2
=
1
1 + r
 0
As a result, the debitor cum aid recipient is in exactly the same situation as before and
dK∗
dA
N
2
=
dY ∗
dA
N
2
=
dU∗
dA
N
2
= 0
If the expected inflow of aid in case of default, A
D
2 , goes up default becomes more attractive and credit
worthiness goes down. To avoid default the creditor has to reduce the face value of the outstanding debt:
dD∗
dA
D
2
= − 1− ηA
(1 + r)
(
1
(1−ηK)
) β
1+β
 0
Since debt obligations in period 2 are reduced, investment will be cut down. But what we have called
disposable income and welfare will certainly increase:
dY ∗
dA
D
2
=
1
1 + α
[
− (1 + r) dD
∗
dA2
]
 0
More aid in period 1, A1, will actually favour non-default and, accordingly, cause increased face value:
dD∗
dA1
=
1 + α
1 + r
[
1−
(
1
1− ηK
)−( β1+β )]
 0
but investment, disposable income, and welfare will increase:
dY ∗
dA1
=
(
1
1− ηK
)−( β1+β )
 0
What if the amount of foreign aid donated is independent of whether the recipient defaults or not, i.e.,
what if A
N
2 = A
D
2 = A2? How will a small increase work in this case?
dD∗
dA2
=
1
1 + r
[
1−
(
1
1− ηK
)−( β1+β )( 1− ηA
1− ηK
)]
If no aid is lost for the recipient in case he defaults, i.e., if ηA = 0,
dD∗
dA2
will certainly be negative. Default
becomes more attractive and the creditor react by cutting down the face value. A sufficiently high ηA will,
however, make dD
∗
dA2
positive, and when ηA = 1 this is exactly the same as an increase in A
N
2 discussed above
and the face value is doomed to increase. What about the welfare level?
We have
dY ∗
dA2
=
1
1 + α
[
1− (1 + r) dD
∗
dA2
]
=
(
1
1 + α
)(
1
1− ηK
) β
1+β
(
1− ηA
1− ηK
)
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Again, by inspection it is clear that when ηA = 1 there will be full crowding out so that
dY ∗
dA2
= 0. As long
as ηA  1, however, the face value is cut down and the sovereign is better off, dY
∗
dA2
 0. The lower ηA, the
better off the sovereign will tend to be.
Higher default costs, no matter of what type, means reduced attractiveness of the default regime and
increased credit worthiness. As a result, forgiveness is reduced and the face value is increased. Higher debt
obligations in period 2 means higher investment, but reduced Y ∗ and welfare. This means that earmarking
aid in ways that favour commercial creditors or providing collateral of some kind in case of default will
clearly be disadvantageous for the sovereign.
So ex post, in negotiations for debt relief, the situation looks very different from the situation ex ante,
negotiating for new credit.
4 Precommitment in investment
So far the sovereign has been free to determine how much to invest (and whether to default or not) after
beeing informed about the creditor’s decision as to new credit or debt relief. In a situation where the
sovereign can make credible promises ex ante concerning the investment level, he can use investment as
collateral and accordingly, a way of signalling credit worthiness9. Sustainable credit obligations in period
2 must still satisfy the condition (1), i.e., if the sovereign chooses default he is hit by costs of the type
discussed above. In addition, to the extent the amount of aid given differs between the two regimes, he loses
the amount A
N
2 −A
D
2 .
4.1 New loans
The two periods’ budget equations are still given by (2a) and (2b) above, but letting
D = 11+r
[
ηK (1 + α)K + ηAA
D
2 + ηY Y 2 +
(
A
N
2 −A
D
2
)]
from (1) they may be expressed as
C1 = Y 1 +A1 +
1
1 + r
(
ηAA
D
2 + ηY Y 2 +
(
A
N
2 −A
D
2
))
−
(
1 + r − ηK (1 + α)
1 + r
)
K and (17a)
C2 = Y 2 (1− ηY ) + (1− ηA)A
D
2 + (1 + α) (1− ηK)K (17b)
A high A
N
2 (compared to A
D
2 ) means that one consequence of choosing default is losing a lot of aid and
works, as a consequence, as collateral for the lender. A high A
D
2 , on the other hand, works in the other
direction as long as ηA = 0. If ηA is positive, however, the fact that some of the aid obtained in case of
default is lost, has a collateral effect, but as long as ηA  1, A
D
2 has a negative effect on the access to credit:
∂D
∂AD2
= 11+r (ηA − 1) 0.
Productive investment has a positive effect on the access to credit and since 0 ∂D∂K = ηK(1+α)1+r  1, we
have −1 ∂C1∂K = −1+ ∂D∂K = −
(
(1+r)−ηK(1+α)
1+r
)
 0. The cost in terms of foregone consumption in period
1 per unit invested, is lower than in the non-default case under discretion. The benefit in terms of increased
consumtion in period 2 of investing one unit is also lower. Now the reason is that the extra credit obtained
in period 1 as a consequence of increase K has to be repaid in period 2. ∂C2∂K = (1 + α) − (1 + r) ∂D∂K =
(1 + α) (1− ηK) .
9We simply disregard credibility problems here.
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Using period 1’s budget equation to express K as a function of C1,
K =
1 + r
1 + r − ηK (1 + α)
[
Y 1 +A1 − C1 + 11 + r
(
ηAA
D
2 + ηY Y 2 +
(
A
N
2 −A
D
2
))]
where ∂K∂C1 = − 1+r1+r−ηK(1+α)  −1, the intertemporal budget equation may be written as
C2 = Y 2 (1− ηY ) + (1− ηA)A
D
2 (17c)
+
(1 + α) (1− ηK) (1 + r)
1 + r − ηK (1 + α)
[
Y 1 +A1 − C1 + 11 + r
(
ηAA
D
2 + ηY Y 2 +
(
A
N
2 −A
D
2
))]
We now have the accounting rate of interest defined by dC2dC1 =
∂C2
∂K
∂K
∂C1
= − (1 +ARIP ) = − (1+r)(1+α)(1−ηK)(1+r)−ηK(1+α) − (1 + α) . Since increasing investment means improved credit worthiness and increased access to credit, and
since borrowing, investing, and repaying is beneficial, i.e., since α r, period 2 consumpiton is ”subsidized”
compared to the discretion case discussed in section 2.
From the first order condition (3), using ARIP the two periods’ consumption, welfare, aggregate pro-
ductive investment, and access to credit may be found. Letting
Y P = Y 1 +A1 +
1
1 + r
(
ηAA
D
2 + ηY Y 2 +
(
A
N
2 −A
D
2
))
+
1
(1+r)(1+α)(1−ηK)
(1+r)−ηK(1+α)
(
Y 2 (1− ηY ) + (1− ηA)A
D
2
)
(18)
we can express consumption in the two periods and welfare as
CP1 =
1
1 + β
[
Y P
]
, CP2 =
β (1+r)(1+α)(1−ηK)(1+r)−ηK(1+α)
1 + β
[
Y P
]
, and
UP = (1 + β) ln
(
1
1 + β
[
Y P
])
+ β ln
(
β
(
(1 + r) (1 + α) (1− ηK)
(1 + r)− ηK (1 + α)
))
and the investment level as
KP =
1 + r
1 + r − ηK (1 + α)
[
β
1 + β
(
Y 1 +A1 +
1
1 + r
(
ηAA
D
2 + ηY Y 2 +
(
A
N
2 −A
D
2
)))
− 1
1 + β
1
(1+r)(1+α)(1−ηK)
(1+r)−ηK(1+α)
(
Y 2 (1− ηY ) + (1− ηA)A
D
2
) (19a)
Once the investment level has been determined, so has the sovereigns credit worthiness, and the access
to credit:
DP =
1
1 + r
[
ηK (1 + α)K
P + ηAA
D
2 + ηY Y 2 +
(
A
N
2 −A
D
2
)]
(19b)
How does aid work in this precommitment case?
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If the inflow of aid in period 1, A1, goes up the sovereign will want to transfer some of it to period 2, so
investment must increase, which again means improved credit worthiness and increased access to credit is:
dKP
dA1
=
1 + r
1 + r − ηK (1 + α)
β
1 + β
 0
dDP
dA1
=
1
1 + r
ηK (1 + α)
dKP
dA1
 0
Of course, Y P , consumption in the two periods, and welfare goes up.
Aid expected to come in period 2 may have very different consequences. Assume first that it is un-
conditional, i.e., that A2 = A
D
2 = A
N
2 and that it increases. Now the last term in (1) disappears and A2
affects the access to credit directly only to the extent that ηA is positive:
∂D
∂A2
= 11+rηA. Increased access to
credit means higher investment, but the fact that increased aid also means higher income in period 2, has a
negative effect on investment.
dKP
dA2
=
(
β
1 + β
)(
1 + r
1 + r − ηK (1 + α)
)(
1
1 + r
ηA
)
−
(
1
1 + β
)(
1
(1 + α) (1− ηK)
)
(1− ηA)
dDP
dA2
=
1
1 + r
[
ηA + ηK (1 + α)
dKP
dA2
]
If ηA = 0, i.e., if aid represents no collateral from the creditor’s point of view, an increase of A2 simply
means higher income in period 2. The sovereign will want to transfer some of it to period 1, so investment
has to be reduced and dK
P
dA2
= −
(
1
1+β
)(
1
(1+α)(1−ηK)
)
 0. As a result, access to credit will also be reduced:
dDP
dA2
= 11+rηK (1 + α)
dKP
dA2
 0. If on the other hand, most of the aid is lost by the sovereign if he defaults,
i.e. if ηA → 1, both investment and access to credit will increase.
Y P , consumption and welfare is bound to increase no matter the level of ηA :
dY P
dA2
=
1
1 + r
ηA +
1
(1+r)(1+α)(1−ηK)
(1+r)−ηK(1+α)
(1− ηA)
=
1
(1+r)(1+α)(1−ηK)
(1+r)−ηK(1+α)
[
(α− r) ηA
(1 + r)− ηK (1 + α)
+ 1
]
However, since α  r, both from the sovereign’s and the creditor’s point of view it is best to keep ηA as
high as possible.
Assume now that A
N
2 and A
D
2 may differ and let A
N
2 increase. The initial effect will be to increase the
access to credit by the entire present value of the aid increase. Investment will certainly increase, increasing
the credit worthiness even more:
dKP
dA
N
2
=
β
1 + β
1
1 + r − ηK (1 + α)
 0
dDP
dA
N
2
=
1
1 + r
[
1 + ηK (1 + α)
dKP
dA
N
2
]
 0
Y P , consumption and welfare is bound to increase.
How will an increase of A
D
2 work? The main difference from A
N
2 is that initially the access to credit
is bound to go down: ∂D
∂A
D
2
= − 11+r (1− ηA)  0. It works as an exogenous transfer of consumption from
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period 1 to period 2. As a result, investment goes down and access to credit is reduced further. Y P , and
accordingly, consumption in both periods and welfare also will be reduced:
dKP
dA
D
2
= − β
1 + β
1
1 + r − ηK (1 + α)
(1− ηA)−
1
1 + β
1
(1+r)(1+α)(1−ηK)
(1+r)−ηK(1+α)
(1− ηA) 0
dDP
dA
D
2
=
1
1 + r
[
− (1− ηA) + ηK (1 + α)
dKP
dA
N
2
]
 0
dY P
dA
D
2
= − 1
1 + r
(1− ηA) +
1
(1+r)(1+α)(1−ηK)
(1+r)−ηK(1+α)
(1− ηA)
= − (1− ηA)
[
(α− r)
(1 + r)− ηK (1 + α)
]
 0
4.2 New face value (Debt forgiveness)
In a situation where D represents a new, reduced, face value instead of new credit, no new credit is given
in period 1, but the face value, i.e., the amount falling due in period 2 is still given by (1). Actually,
precommitment (without default) gives exactly the same results as discretion with default, described in
section 3.2. The budget equations are the same, see (13c):
C2 = (1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2 + (1− ηK) (1 + α)
(
Y 1 +A1 − C1
)
so the ARI must also be the same:
(
1 +ARIP
)
= (1− ηK) (1 + α) . If C1 is reduced (and K increased)
by one unit, the outstanding debt falling due in period 2 increases at exactly the same rate as the sanction
costs. It represents a tax om domestic investment, see f.ex. Krugman (1988).
Investment, present value of income, and face value of debt are given by (see (15b), (14), and (1))
KP =
β
1 + β
[
Y 1 +A1
]− 1
1 + β
[
(1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2
(1− ηK) (1 + α)
]
Y P = Y 1 +A1 +
1
(1− ηK) (1 + α)
[
(1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2
]
DP =
1
1 + r
[
ηK (1 + α)K
P + ηAA
D
2 + ηY Y 2 +
(
A
N
2 −A
D
2
)]
How will aid of different types work in this case? Aid earmarked for non-default situations, A
N
2 , represents
a loss for the sovereign if he defaults and is a pure gift to the creditor in this case. If this type of aid
increases, the face value is increased by exactly the same amount. Aid in case of default, A
D
2 , on the other
hand, represents if ηA = 0 a pure reward in case of default. If it increases, the face value is reduced by
exactly the same amount - thereby increasing the amount at the sovereigns disposal in period 2. If ηA  0,
it tends to reduce the benefit of such aid, as perceived by the sovereign.
Unconditional aid in period 2 means increased face value as long as ηA  0 but also increased Y P as
long as it is lower than unity.
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5 The endogenization of the aid inflow
So far the inflow of aid has been considered as exogenous. That may be sensible for some types of aid, for
example aid given by the creditors’ home country. Aid in case of non-default, A
N
2 , could be considered a
bonus for good behavior. How to consider this type of aid in case of default, A
D
2 , however, is an open question.
If it is low it could represent a punishment for bad behavior but if it is high, especially in combination with a
high ηA, it could be a way of helping the creditors out in case the borrowing government decides to default.
In reality aid is given for many reasons and it is not necessarily exogenous. Assume, for example, that
at least some of the expected aid inflow in period 2 is based on the perception of aid as part of a safety net
financed by altruistic donors looking for ”needs” to satisfy. In the two-period model used above, it seems
natural for the administrator of this safety net to relate ”needs” to consumtion in period 2. The lower the
consumption in period 2 in the absence of his type of aid, the higher the perceived ”need for aid” and the
higher the inflow of aid will tend to be. Pedersen (2001) contains one way of representing this safety net,
where the aid administrator - not being able to cope with the Samaritan’s dilemma (Buchanan (1975)) -
ends up being trapped as a Stackelberg follower10. The formulation below is based on that approach.
Assume that the administrator of the safety-net has an amount A2 at his disposal and that he is respon-
sible for supporting j = 1, ..., J different countries. A number N of these countries do not default while
the number D default. If A2j is the amount given to country j, the budget constraint is
∑J
j=1A2j = A2.
Assume, in addition, that the administrator’s goal is to maximize the recipient countries’ aggregate welfare
W2 =
∑J
j=1 lnC2j where C2j = A2j
(
1− ηAj
)
+ Ĉ2j if country j defaults and C2j = A2j + Ĉ2j if it does
not default. Ĉ2j is the administrator’s perception of the consumption level in the absence of his type of aid.
Being a Stackelberg follower, the administrator considers Ĉ2j as given when he determines how much aid
to give to country j, A2j . If we let C2 be the aid-equivalent of aggregate consumption in period 2 in all
aid-receiving countries except country i, i.e., C2 =
∑
j∈D,j 6=i
Ĉ2j
1−ηAj +
∑
j∈N,j 6=i Ĉ2j , the resulting amount
obtained by country i will be11
AD2i =
1
J
[
A2 + C2 +
Ĉ2i
1− ηAj
]
− Ĉ2i
1− ηAj
in case of default and (20a)
AN2i =
1
J
[
A2 + C2 + Ĉ2i
]
− Ĉ2i in case of non-default (20b)
from which it follows that any effort or activity contributing to consumption in period 2 is ”rewarded” with
reduced aid, i.e., in reality taxed at the rate
tDi = −
∂AD2i
∂Ĉ2i
=
1
1− ηAi
[
1− 1
J
]
in case of default and
tNi = −
∂AN2i
∂Ĉ2i
=
[
1− 1
J
]
in case of non-default.
The benefits of such activities end up, in reality, being divided between all contries receiving aid from
the altruistic donors, i.e., benefitting from the safety-net. The part of the benefits ending up as domestic
10There is no obvious way for an altruistic donor to avoid this problem. See, however, Hagen (2006) for a discussion of how
delegation may work.
11We only consider situations where A2i is strictly positive.
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consumption is
1− tDi =
1− ηAiJ
J (1− ηAi)
and
1− tNi =
1
J
Observe that the tax rate in case of default is higher than if non-default is the government’s decision as long
as some of the aid of the type in question is wasted from the point of view of the donor and the recipient,
i.e., ηAi  0, for example because it ends up in the hands of the lender. This is because the aid equivalent of
an exogenous consumption increase in period 2 is higher in that case. The tax rate in case of default could
actually exceed unity (100%) unless we make the assumption that ηAi  1J .
The existence of the safety-net and the resulting aid allocation rules are known to the borrowing gov-
ernments when they decide whether to default or not and how much to invest in period 1. Also the lender
has this knowledge when he decides how much to lend. Therefore, equipped with these aid allocation rules,
let us return to relationship between the lender and the government discussed above - in a situation where
access to new credit is on the agenda and the borrower has discretion over investment. We Again we
consider the borrowing government first.
5.1 Non-default
From (2b) in section 2.1 above we have period 2 consumption in the absence of the safety-net related aid:
Ĉ2 = Y 2 +A
N
2 +(1 + α)K− (1 + r)D. Once we include this type of aid, AN2 from (20b) above (and skipping
the subscript i), actual consumption may be expressed as C2 = Ĉ2 + AN2 = Ĉ2 +
1
J
[
A2 + C2 + Ĉ2
]
− Ĉ2
= 1J
[
A2 + C2 + Ĉ2
]
or
C2 =
1
J
[
Y 2 +A
N
2 + (1 + α)
(
Y 1 +A1 − C1
)
+ (α− r)D +A2 + C2
]
(21)
The accounting rate of interest is now dC2dC1 = −
(
1 +ARIN
)
= − 1J (1 + α) or −
(
1− tN) (1 + α), clearly
lower than in section 2.1 as long as J  1 and, accordingly, tN  0, i.e., as long as the administrator of the
safet-net has more than one client country. The benefit from investing is taxed and actually split equally
between all the J countries benefitting from the safety-net. This clearly introduces a discrimination against
any activities intended to favour investment and future consumption. On the other hand, the country will
benefit from investment and other activities contributing to consumption in period 2 in other countries
benefitting from the safety-net.
Letting
Y N = Y 1 +A1 +
1
(1 + α) 1J
[
D (α− r) + Y 2 +AN2 +
(
A2 + C2
)] 1
J
(22)
be the present value of the country’s disposable income we have
CN1 =
1
1 + β
[
Y N
]
, CN2 =
β (1 + α) 1J
1 + β
[
Y N
]
, and (23a)
KN =
β
1 + β
[
Y 1 +A1 +D
]− 1
1 + β

(
Y 2 +A
N
2
)
−D (1 + r) + (A2 + C2)
1 + α
 (23b)
Observe that the total (safety-net) aid budget as well as the period 2 consumption of all countries covered
by the safety-net is considered at the government’s disposal when the decision on the investment level i
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period 1 is made. This tends to depress the investment level and planned period 2 consumption without aid
dramatically. The benefits of the altruistic donor’ activities mainly come in period 1, where consumption
certainly goes up when the safety-net is introduced. Consumption i period 2 does not necessarily increase.
The welfare level as perceived by the sovereign may now be calculated as
UN = (1 + β) ln
(
1
1 + β
[
Y N
])
+ β ln
(
β (1 + α)
(
1
J
))
(23c)
5.2 Default
We have earlier made the assumption that it is more profitable to borrow and invest one dollar and then
default, than to borrow and invest and then repay the loan with interest, i.e., (1 + α) (1− ηK) α−r. This
must hold also when we take into account that the aid inflow is affected, i.e., it must hold in an after-tax
sense: (1 + α) (1− ηK)
(
1−ηAiJ
J(1−ηAi)
)
 (α− r) 1J or (1 + α) (1− ηK)
(
1− tDi
)  (α− r) (1− tNi ). Observe
that even if it holds in a pre-tax sense it may not hold when the aid inflow is endogenous, because tDi  tNi
when ηAi  0.
In case of default (6.b) in section 2.2 gives us period 2 consumption without aid of the type in question:
Ĉ2 = (1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2 + (1− ηK) (1 + α)K. With this aid, AD2 from (20a) (again skipping the
subscript i) we have C2 = Ĉ2 +AD2 = Ĉ2 +
1
J
[
A2 + C2 + Ĉ21−η
]
− Ĉ21−ηA =
1−ηAJ
J(1−ηA) Ĉ2 +
1
J
[
A2 + C2
]
or
C2 =
1− ηAJ
J (1− ηA)
[
(1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2 + (1− ηK) (1 + α)
(
Y 1 +A1 +D − C1
)]
(24)
+
1
J
[
A2 + C2
]
and the accounting rate of interest is dC2dC1 = −
(
1 +ARID
)
= −
(
1−ηAJ
J(1−ηA)
)
(1− ηK) (1 + α) or−
(
1− tD) (1− ηK) (1 + α)
which simplifies to − 1J (1− ηK) (1 + α) = −
(
1− tN) (1− ηK) (1 + α) when ηA tends to zero. To avoid
anomalies with a tax rate exceeding 100% we assume that ηA  1J . Letting
Y D = Y 1 +A1 +D (25)
+
1
(1− ηK) (1 + α) 1−ηAJJ(1−ηA)
[(
(1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2
) 1− ηAJ
J (1− ηA)
+
1
J
[
A2 + C2
]]
be the present value of what is considered as the country’s disposable income, we have
CD1 =
1
1 + β
[
Y D
]
, CD2 =
β (1− ηK) (1 + α) 1−ηAJJ(1−ηA)
1 + β
[
Y D
]
, (26a)
KD =
β
1 + β
[
Y 1 +A1 +D
]− 1
1 + β

(1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2 +
1
J [A+C2]
1−ηAJ
J(1−ηA)
(1− ηK) (1 + α)
 , and (26b)
UD = (1 + β) ln
(
1
1 + β
[
Y D
])
+ β ln
(
β (1− ηK) (1 + α)
(
1− ηAJ
J (1− ηA)
))
(26c)
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5.3 The debt limit
Again it is possible to find the maximum amount of lending, D∗∗, as perceived by the lender. Using the
same procedure as in section 2.3 and appendix 1 we have (27):
D∗∗ = Γ

 1J
(1− ηK)
(
1−ηAJ
J(1−ηA)
)

β
1+β (
Y 1 +A1 +
Y 2 +A
N
2 +
(
A2 + Y 2
)
1 + α
)
−
Y 1 +A1 +
(1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2 +
(
A2 + C2
)( 1
J
1−ηAJ
J(1−ηA)
)
(1− ηK) (1 + α)


where Γ = 1
1−
 1J
(1−ηK)
(
1−ηAJ
J(1−ηA)
)

β
1+β
(α−r1+α )
is strictly positive and higher than unity as long as (1− α) (1− ηK)
(
1−ηAJ
J(1−ηA)
)

(α− r) 1J , i.e., as long as borrowing and investing one dollar with default is more profitable than borrowing
and investing with repayment even in an after-tax sense. Γ simplifies to Ω when ηA = 0.
Again, since there is no uncertainty, the government will never default. The amount lent will be D∗∗,
aggregate investment can be found using the KN function above (23b), aggregate income is given by Y N in
(22)and the welfare level from UN in (23c):
K∗∗ =
β
1 + β
[
Y 1 +A1 +D∗∗
]− 1
1 + β

(
Y 2 +A
N
2
)
−D∗∗ (1 + r) + (A2 + C2)
1 + α

Y ∗∗ = Y 1 +A1 +
1
1 + α
[
D∗∗ (α− r) + Y 2 +AN2 +
(
A2 + C2
)]
U∗∗ = (1 + β) ln
(
1
1 + β
[Y ∗∗]
)
+ β ln
(
β (1 + α)
(
1
J
))
5.4 Comparative statics
The comparative static results discussed in section 2.4, related to exogeneous changes of A1, A
N
2 , A
D
2 , ηA, ηY ,
and ηK are still relevant. They follow directly if ηA = 0 so that
1−ηAJ
J(1−ηA) =
1
J and Γ = Ω but letting ηA be
positive (and  1J ) does not affect the main results.
How will a marginal increase of the safety-net aid budget, A2, work? It means extra consumption i period
2 and reduced investment in both regimes. Both UN and UD increase but UD increases most. The reason is
that taking out some of the benefits through increased consumption in period 1 is ”cheaper” in the default
case. Since the two welfare levels are equal at the outset it follows that given the initial debt level, D∗∗, the
government will now choose to default. The lender will therefore cut back on the lending12. Letting ηA = 0
we have:
12This is basically the same experiment as the one carried out in section 2 with A
N
2 = A
D
2 = A2 with ηA = 0.
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dD∗∗
dA2
= Ω
(
1
1 + α
)[(
1
1− ηK
) β
1+β
− 1
1− ηK
]
 0
I.e., the lender reduces the amount lent. What we have called aggregate disposable income, however, in-
creases, i.e.,
dY ∗∗
dA2
=
1
1 + α
[
(α− r) dD
∗∗
dA2
+ 1
]
=
1
1 + α
[
Ω
(
α− r
1 + α
)((
1
1− ηK
) β
1+β
− 1
1− ηK
)
+ 1
]
 0
so aggregate welfare, U∗∗, must increase. Any increase of aggregate consumption in period 2 in other
countries benefitting from the safety-net, C2, will have similar consequences - because more aid will be made
available for ”our” country.
Does the safety-net cause welfare to increase?
We have already seen that endogenous aid (the safety-net) tends to distort incentives and, therefore, lead
to underinvestment and inefficient intertemporal distribution of consumption. We have also seen that as long
as the safety-net is in place it will be in the recipient government’s interest to have the aggregate aid budget
at the administrator’s disposal as high as possible. We now ask whether it really is in the government’s
interest to start to recieve safet-net type of aid and become a client of the altruistic donor. To simplify the
algebra we stick to the case where ηA = 0 so that Γ = Ω but similar results follow for
1
J  ηA  0.
By comparing D∗ in (9) and D∗∗ in (27)we see that endogenous aid tends to crowd out commercial
lending:
D∗∗ −D∗ = Ω
[(
1
1− ηK
) β
1+β
− 1
1− ηK
] (
A2 + C2
)
1 + α
 0
However, we already know that dY
∗∗
dA2
is positive and constant so what we have called disposable income must
be higher with the safety-net than without:
Y ∗∗ − Y ∗ =
[
Ω
(
α− r
1− α
)((
1
1− ηK
) β
1+β
− 1
1− ηK
)
+ 1
] (
A2 + C2
)
1 + α
 0
The benefits of higher disposable income, however, must be weighted against the costs of distorted incentives.
What matters is the difference between the welfare level with endogenous aid, U∗∗, and the welfare level
without, U∗ from section 2.3, i.e., the sign of
U∗∗−U∗ = (1 + β) ln
(
1
1 + β
[Y ∗∗]
)
+β ln
(
β (1 + α)
(
1
J
))
−
(
(1 + β) ln
(
1
1 + β
[Y ∗]
)
+ β ln (β (1 + α))
)
. We have U∗∗ − U∗ R 0 for
(1 + β) ln
(
Y ∗∗
Y ∗
)
R β ln J or
Y ∗∗ R Y ∗J
β
1+β
Using the fact that Y ∗∗ = Y ∗+
[
Ω
(
α−r
1−α
)((
1
1−ηK
) β
1+β − 11−ηK
)
+ 1
]
(A2+C2)
1+α it follows that the
answer depends on the level of A2 +C2, i.e., on the extra income taken into account by the government once
it accepts to become a client of the altruistic donor and on the aggregate number of clients.
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A2 + C2 R
 1 + α
Ω
(
α−r
1−α
)((
1
1−ηK
) β
1+β − 11−ηK
)
+ 1
(J β1+β − 1)Y ∗
As long as there are more than one client country (J  1) the right-hand side is strictly positive. As a
result, if the safety-net aid budget, A2, is very low and/or the other (J − 1) client countries indicate very
low consumption in period 2 if they do not obtain support from the altruistic donor, C2, it may well be
that U∗∗ − U∗ ends up being negative. The benefit resulting from obtaining a small aid inflow is lower
than the cost of distorted intertemporal distribution of consumption. However, letting A2 + C2 increase,
ceteris paribus, means increased aid inflow to ”our” country. For some level U∗∗ − U∗ will change sign and
it becomes worth while for the country to become a client of the altruistic donor.
We have in this section only discussed access to credit in a situation where the sovereign has discretion
over investment. The main consequenses of the safety-net type of aid is closely related to the consequences
of unconditional exogenous aid in period 2. That will be the result in case of debt relief and precommitment
in investment as well.
6 Concluding comments
In this paper we consider the relationship between a commercial lender and the government of a poor country
as a borrower. Influenced by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) we take as our point of departure a model where
the borrower ends up being credit rationed - the reason being that the lender wants to motivate him not
to default. We introduce foreign aid and ask how aid may affect the incentive structure and, accordingly,
the contract designed by the lender (and accepted by the borrower). If the aid flows are exogenous we
show that some types of aid work well in the sense that aid leads to more credit, higher investment and
welfare, etc. However, other types of aid, making it more favourable for the reciopient to default, is directly
counterproductive. Endogenous aid, given by altruistic donors as part of a safety-net, tends to encourage
competition among recipient countries and distort incentives and discriminate against investment. Thereby
investment and, accordingly, credit worthiness is reduced. We show that such aid may actually lead to
reduced welfare in a recipient country. We also discuss how aid of different kinds will affect the lender’s
willingness to give relief in case the initial debt is unsustainable.
Admittedly, the model on which we base our arguments is simple and many of the assumptions made
are not realistic. We believe, however, that the basic incentive structure is captured in a fairly acurate way
and that our main conclusions are relatively robust.
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APPENDIX 1
The debt limit: New loans and discretion over investment
From (5c) and (8c) the condition that UD ≤ UN may be expressed as
(1 + β) ln
(
1
1 + β
[
Y D
])
+ β ln (β (1− ηK) (1 + α))
≤
[
(1 + β) ln
(
1
1 + β
[
Y N
])
+ β ln (β (1 + α))
]
(1 + β) ln
(
Y D
Y N
)
+ β ln (1− ηK) ≤ 0(
Y D
Y N
)1+β
(1− ηK)β ≤ 1
Y D ≤
(
1
1− ηK
) β
1+β
Y N
Since 0 ηK  1 and β 5 1 we know that
(
1
1−ηK
) β
1+β  1 from which it follows that the present value of
the income in case of default will end up being higher than in the non-default case (remembering that the
discount rates differ).
Remembering the determinants of Y D and Y N from (7) and (4) the last version of the equation may be
written as
Y 1 +A1 +D +
1
(1− ηK) (1 + α)
[
(1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2
]
≤
(
1
1− ηK
) β
1+β
(
Y 1 +A1 +
1
1 + α
[
D (α− r) + Y 2 +AN2
])
and now it is straight-forward to calculate the cut-off level of lending, D∗, (the upper limit), as perceived by
the lender:
D 5 D∗ = Ω
[(
1
1− ηK
) β
1+β
(
Y 1 +A1 +
Y 2 +A
N
2
1 + α
)
−
(
Y 1 +A1 +
(1− ηY )Y 2 + (1− ηA)A
D
2
(1− ηK) (1 + α)
)]
where Ω = 1
1−
(
1
1−ηK
) β
1+β (α−r1+α )
≥ 1 because (1 + α) (1− ηK) α− r.
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